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II.

Jurisdiction

JURISDICTION

is conferred upon this court by Rule 3, Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 3, Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals;

III.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal by Mr. Garth Boswell, who was a defendant
and counterclaimant in the case of John Swenson v. Garth Boswell,
which was filed in the Eighth Circuit Court, the State of Utah,
Utah County, Provo Department.

This proceeding appeals and seeks

to reverse the order of Judge E. Patrick McGuire, which denied
defendant's

motion

to

set

aside

the default

judgment

and

reinstate the counterclaim.

IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Whether the judge acted properly in granting a default
judgment

when, although

defendant's

counsel had

withdrawn,

plaintiff had properly notified defendant of the need to obtain
new counsel or else represent himself, and defendant had spoken
to the judge about the motion, but defendant did not respond to
the motion in a legally recognizable way for over three months
after it was made, and the motion was ruled on 19 days after it
1

was made?
2. Whether the judge acted properly in denying a motion to
set aside the judgment referred to above, when the motion

was

made three months after judgment was entered and there was not
even a suggestion that any facts or circumstances had

changed

since the judgment had been entered?

V-

Rule

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS.

2.5, Rules of Practice of the District

Courts

and

Circuit Courts of the State of Utah:
When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record,
written notice of the withdrawal must be served upon
the client of the withdrawing attorney and upon all
other parties not in default and a certificate of
service must be forthwith filed with the court.
An
attorney may not withdraw without an order of the court
where such withdrawal would result in a delay of trial.
If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal
served upon the client shall include a notification of
the trial date.
When as attorney dies or is removed or suspended or
withdraws from the case or ceases to act as an
attorney, the party to an action for whom such attorney
was acting, must before any further proceedings are had
against him, be required by the adverse party, by
written notice to appoint another attorney or to appear
in person.
Rule 2.8(b), Rules of Practice of the District Courts and
Circuit Courts of the State of Utah:
The responding party shall file and serve upon all
parties within 10 days after service of the motion, a
statement of answering points and authorities and
counter-affidavits.

2

VI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case was initiated when John Swenson filed a complaint
against Garth Boswell on April 1, 1986.

Mr. Boswell's attorney,

Sheldon R. Carter, filed an answer and counterclaim, but in June
withdrew from representing Mr. Boswell.
Pursuant

to Rule

2.5

of the Rules

of

Practice

of

the

District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah, counsel
for plaintiff notified Mr. Boswell of the need for him to appoint
new counsel or else appear in person.

This notice, dated June

24, 1986, also informed Mr. Boswell that plaintiff intended

to

move for dismissal of the counterclaim and for summary judgment
if Mr. Boswell did not take some action within ten days of the
date of the notice.
On July 10, 1986, (sixteen days after the notice), after no
response

from Mr. Boswell, plaintiff

moved

for the court to

strike the answer and counterclaim and enter default judgment in
favor of Mr. Swenson.

Notice of this motion was mailed to Mr.

Boswell on the same day.
Apparently as a result of receiving notice of this motion,
on July 14, Mr. Boswell spoke to the Circuit Judge and told him
that he intended to obtain new counsel to represent him in this
matter.

Neither Mr. Swenson nor his attorney were given notice

of this conversation
discussion

was

until well after it had occurred.

apparently

Mr. Boswell's

responding to the motion before the court.
3

only

attempt

This
at

Mr. Boswell did not

file an appearance of counsel or pro se or orjvide any notice to
plaintiff's attorney.
On
Circuit

July
Judge

29,

(19 days

granted

after

the motic * was

the motion

to strike

the

filed),

the

answer

and

counterclaim, and on July 31 an order and judgment was entered
in favor of Mr. Swenson.
Three months later, on October 31, Mr. Boswell (now acting
through Jeffrey B. Brown) moved for the court to set aside the
order and judgment of July 31. After considering memorandums from
both parties, the judge denied this motion on November 24 in a
Minute Entry, with an order being entered on December 19, 1986.
Mr. Boswell filed a Notice of Appeal on January 12, 1987,
claiming error both in the granting of the motion to strike the
answer and counterclaim, and in the judge's refusal to set

the

resultant order and judgment aside.

VII.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Plaintiff notified Mr. Boswell of the need for defendant to
obtain new counsel or else represent himself.

Plaintiff notified

Mr. Boswell of the motion pending before the court.

Mr. Boswell

took no legally recognizable action in response to the motion.
The motion was properly granted.

There was no tenable argument

offered for setting aside the judgment and the Circuit Judge did
not abuse his discretion in refusing to do so.
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VIII.

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT

Defendant has mistakenly

framed

possible violations of Rule 2.5.

this case

the party

terms

of

All that this rule requires is

that, when a party f s counsel withdraws, opposing
notify

in

counsel

must

that he needs to obtain new counsel or else

proceed on his own.

No one doubts that plaintiff did just that.

Indeed, plaintiff went beyond the minimum requirements and
voluntarily informed Mr. Boswell of what to expect should he fail
to take prompt action to get the litigation back on track.
Mr. Boswell made no apparent effort

When

to expedite his affairs,

plaintiff did as he said he would, and moved to strike the answer
and counterclaim.
had had

16 days

This was not done, however, until Mr. Boswell
in which to take action to appoint counsel or

appear in person.
^Then a motion is pending before the court, a party wishing
to respond to it must "file and serve upon all parties within ten
(10) days after service of the motion, a statement of answering
points

and authorities

Practice, 2.8(b).

and

There

counter-affidavits."

Rules

of

is an affirmative duty to act in a

particular way if a person wants to have a voice in the decision.
When Mr. Boswell spoke to the judge, he apparently believed
he satisfied some ambiguous requirement
person", but he did not do what

for him

to "appear

in

is required by the rule to

validate his presumed objection to the motion before the court.
5

In fact, a careful reading of Rule 2.5 seems to indicate that the
only consequence of appearing

in person

is to free

opposing

counsel to continue proceedings against him.
The judge now had before him what amounted to a motion to
grant default judgment.

The ten day response period allowed by

Rule 2.8(b) had expired on July 20.

As pointed out appellant's

brief, Rule 15.5 of the Rules of Practice grants power to waive
strict compliance with the rules in order to prevent injustice,
and that is apparently what occurred.

The motion was not granted

until Mr. Boswell had been given an additional

nine days to

respond to the motion, making it over a month since he had been
notified of the need to obtain new counsel.
Thus, the motion was granted not because Mr. Boswell failed
to secure nev^ counsel within 10 days, but because he failed

to

properly respond to the motion while it was under consideration
by the judge.

To characterize the court's action as a "sanction"

against Mr. Boswell and

"abuse of

misunderstanding

law.

of

require Mr. Boswell
merely informed

the

its discretion" suggests a

Plaintiff

did

not

attempt

to

to obtain new counsel within 10 days, he

defendant of what his next move would be if

defendant failed to do so.
Defendant's arguments in appealing the judge's denial of his
motion to have the order and

judgment

set aside are the

same

arguments made in defense of his position that the motion should
not have been granted in the first place, and as discussed above,
are legally indefensible.

Even if the arguments had any merit,
6

the fact that the motion to set aside the judgment was not made
until three months (to the day) after the order and judgment were
entered suggests that, absent some compelling new developments,
this case should not be re-opened, but the law should achieve a
sense of finality and let the parties get on with their lives.
It is worth noting that had defendant attempted
judicially

efficient

path of simply

appealing

the more

the

default

judgment, he would have been barred by the thirty day time limit
of Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

IX.

CONCLUSION

The only real issue in this case deals with the propriety of
a ruling on a motion when one side has failed to respond in a
legally recognizable way.

The extreme positions a judge could

take would be (1) put the motion on hold until the unresponsive
party decides to take some action on it, or (2) go by the letter
of the law and rule as soon as the ten day response time is over.
In this case, the defendant had informed the judge that he
was going to obtain new counsel in this matter, so the judge gave
him extra time to do so.

When defendant did not do so, the

motion of plaintiff was granted.
The

trial

court

had

interests of both parties.

a responsibility

to protect

the

To force plaintiff to wait until Mr.

Boswell finally took action (over four months after the notice to
obtain new counsel),

would have placed

undeserved hardship.

The court waited a reasonable time after
7

plaintiff

under

an

that required by the law, and then ruled in the only way that
would be legally defensible*
DATED this

day of September, 1987.

Harold D. Mitchell
Attorney for plaintiff
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